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Resilience of Ukrainian clusters – how to strengthen it

Part 3 – Final

The third part concludes the series of publications on the resilience of Ukrainian clusters as a component of the overall resilience of business communities. The first part presented examples of the resilience of Ukrainian clusters, the second analyzed global experience and proposed a checklist of resilience categories. The third part provides an analysis of tools for strengthening resilience, which have been offered by the state since 2022. At the same time, it discusses areas of growth and influence where adding or integrating cluster-based tools would significantly contribute to the resilience of the economy across various sectors and directions.


What the State Has Done

Ukrainian cities and regions located further from the frontline remain in relative safety, and the vast majority of enterprises continue to operate as in peacetime. Aside from constant air raid alerts, it can sometimes feel as if there is no war at all—energy systems, transport and logistics, utilities, schools and hospitals, restaurants, and shopping centers are all functioning. The main credit for this belongs first and foremost to the Defense Forces, including numerous air defense structures. At the same time, the key role and merit in ensuring the resilience and functioning of civilian infrastructure, as well as supporting the economy and businesses, belongs to state authorities-the government, regional administrations, and local self-government bodies.

The list of measures taken by the government since the start of the full-scale war is extensive, and by 2024 the most sustainable and effective ones in the industrial sector have been integrated into the “Made in Ukraine” program. This corresponds to Category B factors, “Operational efficiency and resilience of value chains,” from Part 2 of the article. In particular, the government introduced tools such as:

  • Stimulating demand and localization: expanding the list of goods subject to localization requirements in public procurement. Separately, the government has provided reimbursement for the purchase of domestic products (25% for agricultural machinery and 15% for transport, energy engineering, utility equipment, etc.). Together, this creates predictable domestic demand.
  • Financing and grants: continuation of the 5-7-9 loan program, grants for processing (up to UAH 8 million), micro and veteran grants, incentives for significant investments, and support for industrial park infrastructure development.
  • Industrial parks are positioned as a separate industrial policy tool, offering manufacturers exemption from import VAT and duties on production equipment, a 10-year corporate income tax holiday, the right for local communities to provide local tax benefits, and possibilities for budget financing of infrastructure. Over three years, the number of industrial parks has doubled, now exceeding 100.
  • Energy resilience for business: the Green Platform, tax/customs benefits for importing energy equipment, simplified connections for private generation, and opportunities to sell surplus energy to the grid.
  • Exports and risk insurance: export credit agency (ECA) products for exporters, support for national stands (NAZOVNI and the Office for Entrepreneurship and Export Development), and a new law granting ECA the right to insure investments against war risks (complementing MIGA/DFC).
  • Production relocation: the state program for relocating enterprises to safer regions (761+ companies relocated; 35,000+ jobs preserved/restored).

For 2024–2025, the government has announced approx. UAH 70 billion for Made in Ukraine projects (mortgages, grants, industrial parks, investments). Separately, it is worth noting grant programs for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises—with amounts ranging from several tens of thousands of hryvnias to millions.

At the level of local self-government bodies, there are also various support programs for SMEs and vulnerable social groups—for example, the voucher schemes overview by the Lviv City Council.


Effectiveness of Instruments – Points of Contact with Clusters

Thousands of enterprises have already used the provided instruments, and undoubtedly these measures form the “skeleton” of short- and medium-term resilience, since they:

  • Significantly increase domestic demand and, accordingly, production (localization, cashback). This has been a strong safeguard against revenue decline when domestic markets sharply contracted.
  • Provide “oxygen” for CAPEX/OPEX (5-7-9, grants, industrial parks), supporting modernization, new production, and faster time-to-market.
  • Reduce energy disruptions (own generation, benefits, green financing), ensuring continuity of manufacturing operations.
  • Potentially mitigate war-related risks for investment/export (ECA + MIGA/DFC insurance, exporter products), unlocking projects that otherwise would not launch.
  • Support geographic resilience (relocation) → diversification of production placement.

Overall, these instruments fully address the challenges of martial law. At the same time, cluster policies and instruments are still not in the focus of the government or regional administrations. Only two projects began in 2024–2025:

  • Accelerate GDT (Interreg Europe) – aimed at creating a national cluster policy.
  • Clusters4Regions (supported by UCORD) – development of cluster programs in 6 regions.

Accelerate GDT is expected to promote the spread of cluster programs across sectors and industries through three tools:

  • A general concept of cluster policy, which will provide stakeholders with the first legislative foundation.
  • A national cluster registry, setting minimum compliance requirements for cluster organizations.
  • A cluster accreditation program, offering targeted support to the most promising organizations.

Meanwhile, regional programs developed under Clusters4Regions propose various cluster support instruments—mainly vouchers, micro-grants, and targeted activities aimed at capacity-building, training cluster managers, organizational development, project design, innovation, etc.

As we can see, clusters of the Ukrainian Cluster Alliance (UCA), our partners, are already closely cooperating with authorities, and many instruments are planned for introduction in 2026–2027.


Integration and Synergy Pathways

From the perspective of strengthening the overall resilience of regions and industries, it is important to highlight integration and synergy pathways that are barely, if at all, considered by the above-mentioned projects:

  • Sectoral coordination for critical industries. Much greater attention, with periodic analysis and government-level coordination, should be devoted to programs in critical industries—integrating existing cluster-related tools (ECCP, EEN, EDIHs, etc.). Currently, these tools appear fragmented and uncoordinated across sectors or technology areas. Coordination is also lacking between clusters, business associations, and chambers of commerce. Proper coordination could enable national supply-chain matchmaking at the industry level, linking them to European networks. This, in turn, would improve import substitution of sensitive components (especially shifting from Chinese to European sources) and enhance specialization of Ukrainian enterprises.
  • Mass rollout and unification of vouchers and grants for cluster services. These should not be limited to regional programs but also embedded in national initiatives such as Made in Ukraine. While stimulating market demand is crucial, today there is almost no targeted support for cluster services, which could rapidly address bottlenecks in value chains and ecosystems. For example, clusters could take on pressing tasks across industries:
    • Creating shared prototyping and R&D centers—long critical for Dual-Use / MilTech sectors.
    • Accelerating certification processes—through test labs, assistance in compliance, etc.
    • Providing brokerage and matchmaking between demand and supply for industrial parks, universities, EDIHs, and innovation ecosystems.
    • Building new processing chains and accelerating innovation growth in sensitive sectors (defense industry, dual-use technologies, critical infrastructure).
    • Helping SMEs internationalize and integrate into European industrial and innovation ecosystems.
    • Establishing new retraining and reskilling schools and programs.
    • Addressing import substitution challenges.

This list is far from exhaustive, and some clusters are already doing this on their own. But rather “in spite of” than “thanks to” government support—since in recent years, state support for clusters has been nearly zero. Thus, the examples of clusters’ contribution to national resilience, presented in Part 1 of this publication, are not yet systemic or scalable as they could be. Of course, there is strong hope for the two flagship projects mentioned above, but it is still too early to talk about their full-scale implementation.


UCA Sectoral Development Programs – A Path to European Integration

In 2024, the Ukrainian Cluster Alliance (UCA) made its first attempt to transition to program-based planning by sectors and industries. The previous approach – “let’s generate projects, whatever anyone can propose” – had obvious drawbacks, such as a lack of understanding of strategic, long-term priorities and corresponding planning. A number of UCA clusters began shifting to medium-term planning, focusing on deep sectoral problems and proposing relevant solutions. As a result, the portfolio of these programs and projects includes:

  • A portfolio of 40+ projects focused on ecosystem solutions: twin transition, internationalization, reskilling, cluster management development, all based on the vision of clusters as “orchestrators” of industrial ecosystems. UCA emphasizes that this is precisely what is needed for the operational resilience of value chains.
  • Strategic initiatives – Clusters4Defense / Clusters4Health / Clusters4Reskills – are the first attempts at program formation at the cluster level. Supported by Resource Centers or committees involving multiple clusters, they directly address critical gaps: defense/dual-use value chains, veteran rehabilitation, and workforce shortages.
  • Clusters4Defense is the most formalized program, with five clearly specified directions. In 2025, clusters proposed about 40 projects within these directions. These projects vividly illustrate how to close gaps in value chains, enhance their innovativeness, and increase resilience.
  • Ecosystem tools are reflected in projects developing roadmaps for twin transition by sectors, along with universal projects (included in the roadmaps) such as a shared prototyping center network, an ESG Cluster Hub (green certification/access to green finance), etc.—together directly boosting the operational capacity of SMEs in clusters.
  • Cluster management development. Beyond the classical cluster management school, UCA considers leadership to be the key challenge. Accordingly, UCA plans to launch a leadership academy, along with introducing development instruments such as cluster certification, the national registry, accreditation program, and regional programs.

However, 90% of these programs and projects remain on paper—clusters critically lack recognition from the state and international partners, as well as corresponding funding. It is simply unrealistic for businesses, which themselves often require support, to implement ecosystem projects worth tens of millions of euros on their own.


(Mis)Understanding of Clusters’ and Network Structures’ Roles

The lack of recognition and understanding of clusters’ roles by the state manifests in many ways—from UCA experts constantly correcting new government strategies (even the SME strategy, where early drafts did not mention clusters or other business associations at all) to regional-level strategies where this understanding is equally absent. In the context of this article, let us point to several pain points of the state’s flawed approaches:

  • Individual approach to SMEs instead of an ecosystem one. Most of today’s government instruments are targeted directly at individual SMEs. While SMEs are indeed the “cornerstone” and final beneficiaries of these tools, how and why the government or regional authorities expect to cover tens of thousands of enterprises individually across the country is unclear. Moreover, such an approach fails to address challenges in supply chains, shared infrastructure, and services, where real added value is created collectively.
    A more optimal approach, long applied in the EU and other developed economies, is to treat clusters and other business associations as “entry points” for scaling programs and achieving systemic effects.
  • Excessive centralization of instruments. Often all mechanisms are run through state agencies, creating risks of duplication and bureaucracy. The war has clearly demonstrated the inefficiency of this approach, especially in its early years—many critical supply gaps in weapons, equipment, and population needs were covered by volunteer funds and other network structures, not the state. Even now, the Come Back Alive foundation operates with a budget of UAH 300 million for supplying arms and equipment (including UAH 120 million for R&D), creating numerous product lines for the Armed Forces.
    Instead of ignoring this reality, it should be institutionalized—fully or partially delegating orchestration of regional or sectoral ecosystems to mature cluster organizations as operational agents on the ground, already trusted by businesses and with established networks.
  • Project-based instead of institutional sustainability. Most donor initiatives are short-term, preventing the development of sustainable operational models. Over the past 5–7 years, tens of millions of euros have been fragmented across hundreds of small and micro-projects without coordination. As a result, the overall impact on cluster development has been highly questionable.
    The correct approach is for the Ukrainian government, guided by its own long-term vision, to provide systemic financing of cluster structures over longer cycles (3–5 years), along with a clear strategy for developing these networks as key economic actors. Only then can they become stable partners for the state and donors.
  • Insufficient integration into industrial, defense, and innovation policies. Today, clusters are scarcely involved in Made in Ukraine, industrial park, or defense programs. This overlooks both challenges and opportunities inherent to clusters.
    The government should view clusters as platforms for implementing these instruments—particularly in localization, certification, innovation, twin transition, and production cooperation.

In summary, the lack of recognition of cluster organizations and the misunderstanding of their specific roles in sustainability and resilience of the economy are the root causes of these failures. In Ukraine, clusters are often perceived as business associations, while globally they are ecosystem service operators delivering functions that no other business associations provide (supply-chain brokerage and matchmaking, SME twin transition, shared R&D centers, labs, training platforms, etc.—see the list above).


UCA’s Resilience Priorities

Analyzing current proposals, projects, and clusters’ capacities in relation to existing state programs and instruments for strengthening resilience during wartime, and considering strategic economic challenges, the following priority resilience directions can be outlined:

  1. Clusterization of the economy and its key sectors—primarily through recognition of clusters and strengthening their institutional capacity. Clusters have long been economic actors but are still not recognized by the state.

    Main instruments: national/state policy; sectoral and regional programs for cluster development and support; training of cluster managers; national registry, cluster management standards, and accreditation program.
  2. Development of value chains (VCs). Closing gaps, greater focus on processing, modernization of production capacities, increasing technological levels and innovativeness, and supporting the twin transition of SMEs.

    Role of clusters: orchestrators of VCs and industrial ecosystems.

    Main instruments: voucher schemes and other mechanisms (accreditation, registries, etc.) for supporting collective services—such as professional and industrial brokerage/matchmaking, supply chain platforms, aggregation and promotion of government services for SMEs (industrial parks, certification, processing grants, etc.); workforce reskilling/retraining; import substitution; creation of new links and entire value chains.
  3. Development and support of sectoral, industry-specific, and regional innovation ecosystems. UCA has long concluded that innovation ecosystems must be developed in a differentiated way—by specific industries, technology sectors, and regions.

    Role of clusters: consolidators and promoters of their innovation ecosystems.

    Main instruments: similar to VCs, but tailored to innovation ecosystems—support for consolidation events, inventor/actor mapping, networking, roadmaps; creation of shared prototyping and R&D centers; brokerage and matchmaking with universities and EDIHs; active promotion of innovations to SMEs, etc.
  4. Development of SME internationalization and exports. Ukrainian clusters should naturally become champions of integration with European clusters and leaders in connecting to other networks and programs offered by the European Commission. UCA already has strong ties with dozens of EU clusters and business associations, enabling hundreds and thousands of Ukrainian SMEs to join EU programs. However, these achievements are not yet reflected in state programs, and there is no coordination.

    Role of clusters: leaders in integrating Ukrainian VCs and ecosystems into European ones.

    Main instruments: support for integration and consolidation activities into the EU (incl. jointly with Chambers of Commerce, EERO, Nazovni); vouchers for supporting cluster delegations at trade fairs, business/trade missions; participation in EU events under ECCP; support for harmonization with EU standards, etc.
  5. Support for critical industries. The list of critical industries is well-known: beyond the defense industry, these include transport, energy, infrastructure, healthcare, and essential goods. UCA was established to help these industries survive.

    Role of clusters: partners of state institutions in addressing ecosystem-level challenges of critical industries.

    Main instruments: can include those listed for VCs and innovation ecosystems. In some cases, clusters may be entrusted with special roles and functions depending on their maturity and the needs of state institutions.

This list is preliminary and will be presented for discussion among UCA clusters and our partners in government structures. Comments and proposals are welcome.

Oleksandr Yurchak, CEO of UCA

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